Nonlinearity is a crucial requirement for the substitution boxes in secure block ciphers. In this letter, we derive an estimate for the expected nonlinearity of a randomly selected injective substitution box.
Introduction
Differential cryptanalysis [1] and linear cryptanalysis [2] are powerful cryptanalytic attacks on private-key block ciphers. The complexity of differential cryptanalysis depends on the size of the largest entry in the XOR table, the total number of zeroes in the XOR table, and the number of nonzero entries in the first column in that table [1] , [3] . The complexity of linear cryptanalysis depends on the size of the largest entry in the linear approximation table (LAT) [2] .
One way to reduce the size of the largest entry in the XOR table is to use injective substitution boxes (s-boxes) such that the number of output bits of the s-box is sufficiently larger than the number of input bits. In this way, it is very likely that the entries in the XOR distribution table of a randomly chosen injective s-box will have only small values, making the block cipher resistant to differential cryptanalysis. Some proposed block ciphers, such as CAST [4] and Blowfish [5] , take advantage of this property.
On the other hand, Biham [6] proved that if for an n2m s-box described by f : Z n 2 ! Z m 2 we have m 2 n 0n, then at least one linear combination of the output bits must be an affine combination of the input bits and the block cipher can be trivially broken by linear cryptanalysis. In this letter, we estimate the size of the largest entry in the LAT of a randomly selected injective s-box.
Definitions
The function f : X ! Y is injective (or one-to-one) if for x;
x in X the equality f(x) = f( x) implies x = x. That is, distinct elements of X can not have the same image in Y [7] . 
where 2 Z n 2 ; 2 Z m 2 nf0g, 1 X denotes the inner product of the vectors and X evaluated over Z 2 , and #f1g denotes the cardinality of the enclosed set.
It is straightforward to notice that LAT (; ) = 2 n01 0 d( 1 X; 1 f(X)), where
It is also clear that the nonlinearity of the function f is given by
Throughout the rest of this letter, the = 0 case is not taken into consideration as it does not have any cryptographic significance.
It is easy to see that the number of injective n 2 m s-boxes is given by I(n; m) = P djw (l; k) def = P fd( 1 X; 1 f(X)) = l j wt( 1 f(X)) = kg:
Linear Approximation Table Of Injective Mappings
We first determine the probability distribution of the weight of 1 f(X):
2 n 0k 2 m 2 n :
Proof: For 6 = 0, wt( 1 f) follows the hypergeometric distribution [8] . This follows by noting that the weight of 1 f(X); X 2 Z n 2 has the same distribution as that of the function constructed by randomly choosing 2 n bits from the function 1 where : Z m 2 ! Z m 2 is an arbitrary bijective mapping.
Given the weight of 1f, the distribution of the distance between :X and 1f can be determined :
Lemma 2
For 6 = 0, we have we get lemma 2.
Combining the two results above, the following theorem gives the probability distribution of the distance between 1 X and 1 f(X) for fixed and . This can be used to find the probability that a given entry in the LAT has a particular value, 2 n01 0 l. [9] and other speed-up techniques were used in the calculation of the maximum LAT entries throughout our simulation. It is worth noting that for m = 32, four of the s-boxes out of the ten tested achieved a nonlinearity of 73, while the nonlinearity of the remaining six s-boxes was 72.
Conclusion
We have derived an upper bound for the fraction of injective s-boxes having the maximum absolute value entry in the linear approximation table greater than or equal to a specified value.
Using this result, we derived an estimate for the expected value of this maximum LAT entry for a randomly selected injective s-box. 
